Using a large quasi-time-series dataset, this paper describes and analyzes how a wide range of the economic characteristics of venture-backed firms change as such firms mature through their private, pre-exit stages of life. Three patterns emerge that I interpret as being consistent with a firm-level interpretation of Gort and Klepper's (1982) theory of the life cycle dynamics of a new industry. First, many firm characteristics evolve as a linear function of the number of venture funding rounds received. This is consistent with venture investors seeing firm maturity in terms of business and/or technological milestones, since meeting milestones is a common requirement for firms to obtain a given round of venture funding. Second, as they mature, firms' revenues per employee and the number of patents granted rise, and the fraction of employees in sales (technical) functions increases (falls). This supports the proposition that venture-backed firms transition from establishing technological milestones to establishing business milestones as they mature. Third, departures from linear maturation tend to occur at the Seed round of funding that precedes the 1 st (Series A) round. At the Seed round, managers hold unusually large amounts of equity and their firms are less likely to provide full employee benefits or have adopted formal corporate policies. I interpret this as indicating that venture investors exert their biggest influence at the Series A round and that this influence is permanent, not transitory.
1.

Introduction and Summary
In this paper, I describe and analyze how a wide range of venture-backed firms' economic characteristics develop as the firms mature through their private, pre-exit stages of life.
Although venture-backed companies make significant employment, financial, scientific and technological contributions to the U.S. economy (NVCA, 2004) , relatively little large sample research to date has focused on their business evolution. This study seeks to address this gap by providing scholars, venture investors and entrepreneurial firms with a current, broad ranging and large-sample view of the early life-stage dynamics of venture-backed firms.
The economic characteristics whose maturation dynamics I study include realized annual revenues and one-year-ahead forecasted revenues; employees (in total and by functional area); organizational hierarchy; industry sectors; Boards of Directors; corporate policies; equity holdings; employee cash compensation and benefits; equity values; financings; and attributes of round. This method crucially assumes that round number (an observable variable) is a good proxy for firm maturity (an unobservable variable).
The statistical tests that I conduct on the quasi-time-series data are designed to detect the presence of linear maturation trends in firm's economic characteristics, and identify significant deviations from such trends. The overall goal of the tests is to evaluate the degree to which the evolution of venture-backed firms conforms to a firm-level interpretation of Gort and Klepper's (1982) theory of the prototypical new industry's life cycle. Three main empirical maturity patterns emerge that collectively I interpret as being consistent with a Gort and Klepper-type view of firm-level evolution:
• Most characteristics of venture-backed firms change linearly as a function of the number of venture funding rounds received. This suggests that in much the same way that Gort and Klepper propose that industry evolution has distinct stages produced by underlying economic primitives, so the maturation of venture-backed firms during the private, preexit portion of their lives consists of stages that are technologically or economically homogeneous when grouped by financing round. I conjecture that the staged nature of venture financing reflects this homogeneity because venture funds typically invest only after a firm has accomplished a given set of technological and/or business milestones.
• Revenue per employee and the number of patents granted rise as venture-backed firms mature, and the fraction of firm employees in sales (technical) functions increases (falls). This is consistent with venture-backed firms experiencing Stage 1 of Gort and Klepper's industry-level theory, the Introductory Stage. In this stage, maturing firms adjust their corporate focus away from proving the technological or scientific validity of their innovations toward demonstrating the business demand for those innovations.
• Departures from linear maturation typically occur at the Seed round, that is, the round that precedes the Series A round. At the Seed round managers hold unusually large amounts of equity and firms are less likely to have adopted formal corporate policies or provide full benefits to employees. This suggests that venture investors exert their greatest influence on a firm at the Series A round, and that their influence is permanent rather than transitory. Although Gort and Klepper's life cycle theory is silent regarding venture investors, when viewed in the light of research that documents the beneficial roles that venture investors play in solving agency and information asymmetry problems in intangible-intensive, technology-based young companies (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Hellman 2000; Hellman and Puri, 2000, 2002) , I interpret my finding as indicating that by means of the financial and organizational capital they bring to bear, venture investors raise the probability that innovative firms will in aggregate be sufficiently successful so as to be able to mature sequentially through Gort and Klepper's more general and longlived industry-level life stages.
In addition to these aggregate maturation patterns, I report descriptive statistics on a rich variety of venture-backed firms' business characteristics. By providing a contemporary and detailed depiction of the early life-stages of an increasingly important sector of the U.S.
economy, this study adds to the contributions made by prior work that has looked into the evolution of young technology-centric firms (Houlihan Valuation Advisors, 1998; Barron et al., 1999 Barron et al., , 2001 Kaplan et al., 2005) .
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature on industry-level and firm-level life cycles, both in general and specifically with regard to venture-backed companies. Section 3 highlights the contributions of this study relative to prior work, and develops the three main propositions of the paper. Section 4 describes the proprietary databases used, while Section 5 explains how cross-sectional data is converted into quasi-time-series data and outlines the statistical framework used to test the propositions developed in Section 2. Section 6 describes the maturation dynamics of venture-backed firms' economic characteristics, and reports the results of formal statistical tests. Section 7 summarizes the study's limitations. Section 8 concludes.
2.
Literature review
Industry life-cycle economics
Two main features characterize prior research into firms' life cycles. First, the lion's share of life-cycle research has been at the industry level. Relatively little work has examined the expansion or contraction paths of individual firms over their lives, or as a function of firm maturity. And second, both theoretical and empirical understanding at the industry level have been contributed by a wide range of social science disciplines, including accounting, economics, finance, management, and strategy (Dickinson, 2005) .
A key study into the economic determinants of industry life cycles is Gort and Klepper's (1982) evolutionary theory of the diffusion of product innovations. In contrast to the approaches taken by organizational ecologists (e.g., Baum and Pownell, 1995) and technology theorists (e.g., Suarez and Utterback, 1995) , Gort and Klepper hypothesize that the prototypical industry based on the introduction of a new product proceeds through five periods or stages, each of which reflects a major transition in the forces that determine the number of producers of the product.
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In the introductory stage, stage 1, a product innovation (which is exogenously assumed by Gort and Klepper to be technically fully developed) is introduced into the market by a single producer with the aim of building product awareness and market share (Jovanovic, 1982) . Stage 2, the growth stage, is characterized by large investments in tangible and intangible assets and a sharp increase in the number of producers (Jovanovic, 1982; Spence, 1977 Spence, , 1979 Spence, , 1981 .
In stage 3, the maturity stage of the new industry's life cycle, obsolescence of initial investments relative to new investments such that the number of entrants is roughly balanced by the number of exiting firms, while in stage 4, the shakeout stage, there is substantial negative net entry. In the final stage, the number of firms in equilibrium is defined by market size and economies of scale until the product becomes obsolete and the industry either dies or is reborn through new technology launching a new product.
The most important force modeled by Gort and Klepper is the probability of entry by a new firm, which is proposed to be a positive function of the number of innovations coming from sources outside the industry, a negative function of the accumulated stock of experience held by incumbent producers, and a positive function of incumbent producers' profit (and thus the potential rewards to a new entrant). 2 Gort and Klepper's theory has been extended by Klepper and Graddy (1990) and Agarwal and Gort (2002) , among others.
Life-cycle analysis of venture-backed firms
To the extent that Gort and Klepper's theory can be interpreted or hypothesized as applying at the level of an individual firm, my study focuses on the economic causes and consequences of the introductory and growth stages, together with the period of technical development that precedes the introductory stage. Research that examines these entrepreneurial life stages has generally either been focused on one aspect of the firm, or has been somewhat disadvantaged by having available relatively sparse data about firms' business characteristics.
3
A key source of data limitations is that firms in the youngest stages of their life cycles are almost always privately held. As a result, and unlike their more mature publicly traded cousins, they are not required by SEC rules or other regulatory bodies to disclose any financial information about their economic performance, nor are their equity values or returns publicly observable. This makes it difficult to systematically obtain broad ranging business-related information on a large set of firms as they progress from birth to maturity.
Venture-backed private firms represent a significant exception to these general data constraints. The reason is that the longevity, size and growth of the U.S. venture capital market means that not only do venture funds themselves have rich data on their portfolio companies as they mature from birth to exit, but specialized companies have been formed whose key goal has been to actively collect broad and deep business relevant information on large numbers of venture-backed entities, particularly during the private, pre-exit phases of their lives.
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Several studies have used small samples of rich data on venture-backed firms obtained either from venture funds or from direct contact with companies. Most recently, for example, Kaplan et al. (2005) break new ground by tracing the real time evolution of 49 venture-backed companies founded between 1975 and 1998, starting with their early business plan and progressing to their IPO and three years post-IPO. 5 The focus of Kaplan et al. is on empirically identifying either the "glue" that property rights theories of the firm argue holds firms together (Hart, 1995; Holmstrom, 1999) and/or the key resources on which critical resource theories hypothesize firms base their growth (Wernerfelt, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 2001 ). They find support for both sets of theories, although they note that there exists significant ambiguity as to whether human capital is the modern young firm's most critical resource as conjectured by Zingales (2000) . Overall, Kaplan et al. report that:
• Venture-backed firms' business models remain very stable over time, despite the dramatic growth they experience.
• Venture-backed firms consistently sell to similar customers and compete against similar competitors.
• Venture-backed firms consistently claim to be differentiated by a unique product, service or technology.
• Although venture-backed firms stress the importance of proprietary IP, their alienable assets (i.e., patents and physical assets) become ever more important as they mature.
• The human capital in venture-backed firms changes considerably over time-more so than their non-human capital-and is generally not tied to specific individuals.
Other studies have used large sample datasets obtained from either VentureOne or Venture Economics but typically in a way that targets one or two specific economic characteristics for in-depth analysis conditional on firm maturity. For example, Houlihan
Valuation Advisors (1998) describe changes in the value of venture-backed high-tech and lifesciences companies between their initial equity financing round, interim financing rounds, and their IPO. More rigorously, Gompers and Lerner (2000) examine the roles that a variety of proxies for firm maturity (firm age, stage of development, business status) play inter alia in explaining cross-sectional variation in firms' pre-money valuations, the amount of money they raise, the time between financing rounds, and exits.
Contributions of this study
In this study, I also describe and analyze venture-backed firms' economic characteristics as they mature, but with several differences in data, methodology and focus versus prior work.
Novel and large sample quasi-time-series dataset
I employ quasi-time-series data that is derived from cross-sectional survey information collected primarily by VentureOne but also by Advanced-HR, Inc. That is, my data are not a true time-series as in Kaplan et al (2005 Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Kaplan et al. (2005) , I also describe and investigate a number of previously unexplored but plausibly important firm characteristics. These include organizational structure (e.g., the number of VPs, Directors and
Managers by functional area, and VP span of control by functional area), corporate policies (e.g.,
whether the firm has a formal pay policy in place), cash compensation by position and functional area, and employee benefits.
3.2
Firm-level characterization of Gort and Klepper's (1982) industry-level theory of product innovation, diffusion and maturation
The statistical tests that I conduct on the large sample quasi-time-series dataset outlined above are designed to detect the presence of linear maturation trends in firm characteristics, and identify significant deviations from such trends. The motivation behind the tests is to shed light on three broad propositions pertaining to venture-backed firms, each of which emerges from or can be connected to a firm-specific interpretation of Gort and Klepper's (1982) industry level theory of product innovation diffusion highlighted in section 2.1:
• Proposition 1: That the maturation dynamics of venture-backed firms consist of economically and/or technologically homogeneous stages for which firms' financing rounds are good proxies. That is, in much the same way that Gort and Klepper propose that the entire life cycle of the typical industry consists of multiple, distinct stages, I conjecture that the staged nature of venture financing reflects a fundamental aspect of firm maturity because venture funds typically invest only when the firm has accomplished certain technological and/or business milestones.
• Proposition 2: That the early stages of firm life focus on transitioning away from establishing technological or scientific milestones toward demonstrating the business viability of the firm's innovations. In effect, Proposition 2 conjectures that stage 1 of Gort and Klepper's view of how a prototypical new industry evolves-the Introductory Stage-also occurs at the firm level.
• Proposition 3: That venture investors exert the most influence on a firm at the Series A financing round, and in a way that is permanent, not transitory. Although Gort and Klepper's theory is silent as to venture capital investors, I conjecture that the business expertise, networks and financing that venture investors provide to young, innovative companies enhances the probability that those firms, and the industries they represent, will be sufficiently successful as to be able to sequentially mature through the life stages theorized by Gort and Klepper. By examining the degree to which the propositions above are empirically supported or rejected, this study hopes to contribute to the entrepreneurial literature with regard to identifying and understanding the economic causes and consequences of the evolution of venture-backed firms' business characteristics as the firms mature through their private, pre-exit stages of life.
Databases
This study benefits from being granted confidential access to the databases of two companies that collect data on venture-backed firms-VentureOne and Advanced-HR.
VentureOne is the world's leading venture capital research firm, offers investors, service providers, and entrepreneurs the most comprehensive, accurate, and timely information on the venture capital industry. Its products and services help venture capital firms, corporate investors, investment banks, and accounting and law firms identify private investment opportunities, perform due diligence, and evaluate market trends, including company valuations and industry preferences. Advanced-HR is a smaller company that specializes in employee benefits.
VentureOne surveys
The data in this study come predominantly from proprietary surveys undertaken by VentureOne in spring 2004 and spring 2005. 6 VentureOne emailed a web-based compensation questionnaire to each of the roughly 5,000 venture-backed firms in its financing database that it classified as being pre-IPO and independent. The questionnaire asked firms to provide data on a broad set of compensation-and business-related items. For example, companies were asked to report the dollar values of the base salary, bonus, and other cash compensation of every employee (up to a maximum of 50 people from the most senior person down); the number of employees that receive stock options; the total number of shares of founder's stock and exercised and unexercised options that each held; and the total number of both fully diluted and common shares that the firm had outstanding. VentureOne also asked each firm to report revenues for its most recently completed fiscal year; its forecast of revenues for the fiscal year in progress (which I refer to as 'one-year-ahead' forecasts); the number of employees at the end of its most recent fiscal year, both in total and by job function (administrative, business development, finance, marketing, sales, technical, and 'other'); and the total number of employees it expected to have at the end of the current fiscal year.
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The data from VentureOne's surveys were then merged with VentureOne's financing and general support databases. VentureOne's financing database contains a record of each firm's equity financing history, where available. For each round of funding, the financing database reports the amount of money raised, when the round closed, the pre-and post-money valuations of the firm, the type of round (e.g., Seed, 1 st , 2 nd ), the firm's business status (e.g., Startup, Product Development, Shipping), and the ID code and type of each investor that participated in the round. The general support database contains general information about each firm, such as its industry, state, and telephone area code, as well as details on current and former senior management and Board members, such as their title, type (e.g., outside Board member, venture investor Board member) and whether they are or were one of the firm's founders. Finally, the number of patents granted to each firm at June 30 of the most recently completed fiscal year as well as June 30 of the forecasted year ahead was obtained from www.uspto.gov. Table 1 lists the restrictions that I placed on VentureOne's databases to arrive at a robust set of observations. Of the roughly 5,000 venture-backed firms to whom VentureOne emailed its compensation survey, a total of 1,296 responded. 8 Of these, 42 firms were eliminated because they had been acquired or merged, were already public or in IPO registration, or had gone out of business. This yielded 1,254 firms that were truly private and independent venture-backed pre-IPO companies. Untabulated analysis indicated that respondents were not significantly different 7 A full listing of the items requested from survey participants is available from the author upon request. 8 The annual response rate of approximately 20% compares favorably with other compensation surveys.
For example, in a study of companies with broad-based stock option plans, Weeden et al. (2001) 
Advanced-HR's OptionImpact database
Distinct from VentureOne's company-specific dataset, my study also draws on aggregate information regarding the employee benefits and performance reviews of venture-backed firms 
Quasi-time-series data, statistical analysis framework and economic hypotheses
The VentureOne and Advanced-HR databases are cross-sectional in nature, consisting of one observation per firm. A natural question to ask is how then can such databases provide insights into how and why the economic characteristics of venture-backed firms evolve through their pre-IPO stages of life, given that evolution is a time-series phenomenon?
9 I developed and estimated a logistic regression model to discriminate between respondents and nonrespondents. Using data available in VentureOne's aggregate financing and valuation database (which did not include compensation data), less than 1% of the variance could be explained. The independent variables used were the age of the firm, the date of its most recent round of equity financing, the number of its most recent round of equity financing (e.g., 1 st , 2 nd , etc.), the amount raised in that round, the state in which it is headquartered, its life-stage (e.g., start-up, product development, beta testing, shipping, profitable, clinical trials, and restart), and the industry sector the firm was in. This analysis notwithstanding, in private correspondence VentureOne indicated that it is their belief that it is firms that anticipate seeking further funding from venture capital funds that are most likely to respond to the survey. 10 Funding rounds are sometimes labeled according to Series, where Series A is the 1 st round, Series B is the 2 nd round, etc. For simplicity I use the terms 1 st round, 2 nd round, etc. 11 The author is most grateful to D. DiPietro, founder of Advanced-HR, for granting him access to her OptionImpact database. 12 Between 8/20/04 and 8/20/05, some 192 firms provided data items to Advanced-HR. Due to the recentness of their data, these were the firms used by Advanced-HR on 8/20/05 (the date that the relevant information on the OptionImpact database was viewed by the author) in calculating means of the firm characteristics used in this study.
The answer is that under certain assumptions, cross-sectional data can be converted into quasi-time-series data. In this study the temporal dimension that I create to convert crosssectional data into quasi-time-series data is RoundNumber, the number of the firm's most recent venture funding round, defined as RoundNumber = 0 (Seed round), RoundNumber = 1 (1 st round), RoundNumber = 2 (2 nd round), RoundNumber = 3 (3 rd round), RoundNumber = 4 (4 th round) and RoundNumber = 5 (≥ 5 th round). The key assumptions behind such a conversion are that the characteristics of pre-IPO venture-backed firms depend on maturity, and that the number of the most recent funding round is a good observable proxy for unobservable firm maturity.
The statistical framework that I employ to analyze the quasi-time-series data is illustrated in table 2. First, I report either the frequency or the mean of each firm characteristic according to
RoundNumber. Second, I estimate the regression:
where Y i = the characteristic being analyzed for firm i, and DSeed i = 1 if the firm's most recent funding round prior to the survey date was a Seed round, zero otherwise. The coefficient on RoundNumber measures the mean change in Y associated with a firm moving through (in the quasi-time-series sense) one more round of venture funding. The coefficient on DSeed measures the degree to which a firm whose most recent funding was a Seed round has an abnormally high or low average value of the firm characteristic being analyzed, after controlling for the linear effect, if any, of RoundNumber.
I use equation (1) to evaluate the validity of the assumptions delineated above concerning the conversion of cross-sectional data to quasi-time-series data. If these assumptions are valid, it should be the case that θ ≠ 0-that is, firm characteristics depend in a reliably linear manner on RoundNumber. I also use equation (1) to test the proposition that venture investors exert their greatest influence on a young firm at the 1 st round of funding. Although both Seed and 1 st rounds are technically venture capital financings, they differ in that Seed rounds typically involve much smaller dollar investments and manifest a higher level of participation by individual angel investors. 13 As a result, I hypothesize that venture investors in Seed rounds will only find it cost-effective to passively provide the investee firm with money, while in 1 st rounds they will find it cost-effective to actively provide money, business expertise, and connections.
14 If so, and if firm characteristic Y i is one that is supplied through venture investor business expertise or connections, then I expect to observe β ≠ 0.
Maturation dynamics
Results of estimating equation (1)
This section describes the results of estimating equation (1) for a wide variety of firms' economic characteristics. The tables in which my findings appear are:
• General firm characteristics Table 2 • Corporate policies Table 9 • Revenues Table 3 • Equity holdings Table 10 • Employees Table 4 • Employee benefits Table 11 • Organizational hierarchy Table 5 • Cash compensation Table 12 • Life-stages Table 6 • Equity values & financings Table 13 • Industry sectors Table 7 • Founders  Table 14 • Boards of Directors Table 8 In the remainder of this section, I highlight key findings in each table, noting where the evolution of venture-backed firms conforms to the firm-level interpretation of Gort and Klepper's (1982) theory of the prototypical new industry's life cycle delineated in the three propositions developed in section 3.2.
General firm characteristics (Table 2)
As the number of financing rounds received from venture investors increases, firm age increases, the number of patents granted increases, and the year-to-year growth in the number of patents granted increases. On average, financing rounds are 0.9 years apart and one more financing round is associated with an additional 0.9 granted patents and an increase of 0.3 in the year-to-year growth in granted patents. In contrast, the across-state and within-state geographic densities of venture-backed firms (as proxied by the fraction of firms' headquartered in California or Massachusetts and the percent of firms that share the same telephone area code) do not change as firms mature.
6.3
Revenues (Table 3 (columns 4-6). As firms mature and scale up their activities, they hire more of all types of employee. However, because firms shift from establishing the technical feasibility of their technology or scientific-based innovations to proving business demand, they hire relatively more sales people (column 5) and Other employees (column 7) and relatively fewer technical personnel (column 6).
6.5
Organizational hierarchy (Table 5 ) Table 8 showed that venture investors influence firms' Boards of Directors. Table 9 demonstrates that they also have a significant influence on firms' policies.
Corporate policies (Table 9)
The results in panel 9.A are derived from VentureOne's database and span two types of corporate policies-formal and discretionary. Formal policies consist of formal pay policies, established stock grant guidelines, formal sales commission plans, and defined bonus plans.
Discretionary policies comprise discretionary bonus plans and the awarding of hire-on bonuses.
Several findings stand out from panel 9.A.
First, firms at the Seed round have relatively few formal policies in place. This is not that surprising since at the Seed round the economic payback to allocating scarce resources to determining and then implementing a set of formal corporate policies would seem small, there being only 10 employees on average in place at that time (see panel 4.A).
Second, by the time they have matured to the ≥5 th funding round, having formal policies in place is the rule rather than the exception. The increase in the intensity of formal policies from Seed to ≥5 th funding round comes about in two ways. Consistent with Proposition 3, for three of the four formal policies described in panel 9.A there is a significant increase between the Seed and 1 st funding rounds. The percentage of firms with formal pay policies, established stock grant guidelines, and formal sales commission plans roughly doubles between the Seed and 1 st funding rounds. Alongside these one-time shifts, it is also the case that there is a maturation trend over time. Thus, the percentage of firms with formal sales commission plans and the percentage of firms with a defined bonus plan increase linearly with RoundNumber.
Finally, discretionary policies appear to be independent of both firm maturity and the move from Seed to 1 st funding rounds. This may be because the costs of determining and implementing discretionary corporate policies are smaller than is the case for formal policies.
The results reported in panel 9.B, which are derived from Advanced-HR's OptionImpact database, also support Proposition 3, and in a way that moves investee firms from informal to formal corporate policies. Relative to VentureOne's database, the OptionImpact database reports two additional types of corporate policies: the percentage of firms that conduct performance reviews of their employees at different points in time, and the percentage of firms that have established pay ranges for staff positions. From the figures reported in panel 9.B, it appears that firms at the Seed funding round are markedly more likely to conduct performance reviews on a discretionary as-needed basis, less likely to conduct focal performance reviews, and less likely to have established pay ranges for staff position. 
Equity holdings (Table 10)
Equity incentives are widely used by firms to incent, motivate and retain employees. This is especially so in venture-backed firms, where intensely technology or science-based assets and investment opportunities are fraught with information asymmetry and agency problems that can fruitfully be ameliorated by strong equity incentives. Hand, 2005) . Second, the fraction of employees who are granted stock options reliably increases by 2.3% per financing round. While this result could be indicative of a genuine firm maturation trend, it might instead reflect a decline over calendar time. The latter explanation is possible because over the past 17 The nature of OptionImpact's figures precludes statistical tests of significance because OptionImpact reports the mean figure by financing round rather than firm-specific information.
several years the FASB has successfully sought to require firms to expense the costs of stockbased compensation. One of the responses that some have suggested firms will take to having to show stock option expenses in their income statements is to cut back on how deeply in their organizations they grant options. The data in panel 10.A is consistent with such a response occurring on a proactive, but limited, basis.
The second finding of note across panels 10.A and 10.B is that both as a group and by seniority level, employees hold a steadily declining fraction of total equity as firms mature. In contrast, the fraction of equity held by venture investors steadily increases. Third, CEOs hold a disproportionate share of the equity held by employees as a whole-roughly 50% at all stages of firm maturity (panel 10.A, column 5 as compared to column 3).
Fourth, consistent with Proposition 3, several equity attributes decline significantly between the Seed and 1 st rounds of venture funding. The attributes are: Executive equity as a percent of all equity, and the percentage of equity held by the CEO, VPs, and Directors.
Employee benefits (Table 11)
Using the OptionImpact database, table 11 reports the relations between firm maturity by RoundNumber and employee benefits. On the one hand, the results shown in panel 11.A indicate that the mean number of vacation days, and the total paid days off per employee and the components of that total (company paid holiday and sick leave) are insensitive to how mature the firm is. On the other hand, firms appear to grant markedly more of the specialized types of employee benefits at the 1 st funding round than at the Seed round. This too is consistent with Proposition 3. It also echoes the findings reported in table 9 that indicated that a key area in which venture investors exert influence is corporate policies. Third, the probability of receiving a cash bonus is increasing in firm maturity at all employee ranks except that of Manager (panel 12.D). The amount of the increased probability per financing round varies between 3% for Directors and 12% for Presidents. It is also the case that for three of the seven employee ranks, the mean bonus conditional on receiving a bonus is reliably increasing in RoundNumber (CEOs, CFOs and VPs, panel 12.E).
Cash compensation (Table 12)
Fourth, neither base, bonus or total cash compensation is unusually low at the Seed round as compared to the linear maturity trends fitted by means of RoundNumber. Specifically, of the 21 different estimated coefficients on the Seed dummy in panels 12.A, 12.B, 12.C and 12.E combined, none are reliably different from zero. This implies that venture investors do not exert any particularly large influence on investee firms' cash compensation at the 1 st funding round. 6.14 Founders (Table 14) The final table describes people than 'practical, get-it-done' people. Finally, panel 14.C suggests that Founders tend to remain at the same managerial rank as firms mature.
Equity values and financings (Table 13)
7.
Limitations of the study
There are two key limitations to this study. First, and most importantly, the data used is quasi-time-series in nature, rather than a true time-series as in Kaplan et al. (2005) . The benefits obtained by using quasi-time-series data (viz., large sample size, ability to conduct regression tests of maturity effects in firm characteristics) come at a cost. For example, the sample contains only those venture-backed firms that had not exited when VentureOne made its surveys. Since it is well documented that exits-particularly IPOs-do not occur randomly over time but in waves (so-called hot issue / cold issue markets), this may mean that the inferences arrived at in the study are biased because in terms of older firms the database only contains firms that were not successful enough to have exited in the last hot issue market.
Second, there are many important firm attributes that are not covered by this study.
These include alliances (Nicholson et al., 2005) , patent scope (Lerner, 1994) , international activities, management and employee gender and diversity, profitability and financial health, and entrepreneur experience, to name but a few. It would be worthwhile and enriching to examine such characteristics if and when data became available or could be created by researchers.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have used a large new quasi-time-series database to describe and analyze how and why a variety of venture-backed firms' economic characteristics develop as such firms mature through their private, pre-exit stages of life. In doing so, my study makes two contributions to research in entrepreneurship. First, by describing a wide variety of venture-backed firms' business characteristics, I provide a contemporary and detailed depiction of the early life-stages of an increasingly important sector of the U.S. economy and add to the contributions of prior work that has looked into the evolution of young technology-centric firms (Houlihan Valuation Advisors, 1998; Barron et al., 1999 Barron et al., , 2001 Kaplan et al., 2005) . Second, by appealing to Gort and Klepper's theory of the life cycle evolution of a new industry, I have sought to provide a perspective on the maturation of young companies that complements that of other perspectives such as Kaplan et al. (2005) . It seems likely that the diversity, fluidity and creativity of young companies are too rich to be neatly contained within one and only one theory. This suggests that there remains much to be learned about the maturation dynamics of private firms in general, and venture-backed entities in particular. Between the rows marked Seed and ≥5 th are the means of firm characteristics by the Round Number of firms' most recent funding round prior to VentureOne's survey date (spring 2004 or spring 2005) . After those six rows are reported the estimated coefficients and associated tstatistics on the indicator DSeed and the variable RoundNumber in the following regression:
, where
• Y i = the variable being analyzed for firm i;
• DSeed i = 1 if the firm's most recent funding round prior to the survey date was a Seed round, zero otherwise; and • RoundNumber i = the number of the firm's most recent funding round prior to the survey date, with a Seed round carrying a value of zero, a 1 st round carrying a value of one, etc.
The coefficient on RoundNumber measures the mean change in the dependent variable associated with a firm going through (in the cross-sectional sense) one more or one less funding round. The coefficient on DSeed measures the degree to which a firm whose last funding was a Seed round has an abnormally high or low average value of the firm characteristic being analyzed, after controlling for the linear effect of RoundNumber.
Single and double asterisks denote a coefficient estimate that is reliably different from zero at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively, under a two-tailed test. Table 11 Employee benefits
The data in this table are from Advanced-HR, Inc.'s OptionImpact database. The maximum number of firms over which statistics are calculated is 192. All data items were provided to Advanced-HR by firms between 8/20/04 -8/20/05. Table 12 Cash compensation
All cash compensation amounts are in $000s. Means are calculated over all available employee observations for a firm, subject to an employee receiving an annual base salary of at least $10,000 and being at or more senior than the manager level (i.e., senior management, vicepresidents, directors, and managers). Employees below the level of manager are not included. In VentureOne's survey, firms are permitted, but not required, to provide compensation data on up to, but not more than, 50 employees. Total cash compensation is base salary + bonus + other cash compensation. Table 13 Firm equity values and financings Panel 13.A Mean firm equity values at the last (i.e., the most recent) funding round for which a pre-money equity value for the firm was available (n = 445 to 450) 
